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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to model the impacts of competition between cities on both the
optimal welfare generating tolls and upon longer-term decisions such as business and
residential location choices. The research uses a dynamic land use transport interaction
model of two neighbouring cities and analyses the impacts by setting up a game between
the two cities to maximise the welfare of their own residents. The work builds on our earlier
research which studied competition in a small network using a static equilibrium approach for
private car traffic without accounting for the land use responses to the change in
accessibility. This paper extends the earlier work by setting up a dynamic model which
includes active modes of travel and the more usual car and public transport in a realistic twin
city setting and assesses the longer term relocation responses. This paper firstly sets out the
competition between two hypothetical identical cities i.e. the symmetric case; and then sets
out the real world asymmetric case in which the cities are of different size representative of
Leeds and Bradford in the UK but equally applicable elsewhere too. It was found that the
level of interaction between the two cities is a key determinant to the optimal tolls and
welfare gains. Our findings show that the competition between cities could lead to a Nash
Trap at which both cities are worse off in terms of welfare gains. On the other hand, we
found that cities, if regulated, would gain in terms of welfare and yet charge only half the toll
compared with tolls under competition. We then show that the effect of competition
increases with increased interaction between cities. In terms of residential location, cities
with higher charges benefit from an increase in residents, though as with other studies, the
2relative change in population in response to cordon charging is small.
The policy implications are threefold – (i) while there is an incentive to cooperate at local
authority level, this is not achieved due to competition; (ii) where cities compete they may fall
into a Nash Trap where both cities will be worse off compared to the regulated solution; and
(iii) regulation is recommended when there is a strong interaction between the cities but that
the benefits of regulation decrease as interaction between cities decreases and the impact of
competition is lessened.
Keywords: Competition between cities, land use transport interaction, strategic transport
model, road user charging.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cities compete with each other. For more than fifty years, Public Choice Theory has
explored the notion that cities compete to attract and retain residents and businesses
(Tiebout, 1956; Basolo, 2000). Likewise, the Public Finance & Tax Competition literature
identifies competition between cities on tax-and-spend policies (Wilson, 1999; Brueckner
and Saavedea, 2001).
This paper forms part of a larger study which aimed to answer the following policy questions:
 In what ways do and could cities compete using fiscal demand management policies?
 How should cities design their policies to achieve individual and collective ‘best’
outcomes?
 Should cities consider sharing revenue streams – should they compete or co-operate?
 How significant are these policies to the redistribution of business and residents between
cities?
Early work by Marsden and Mullen (2012) has looked at the motivations of decision-makers
in local government in different towns and cities of four major city regions in England. It
showed that towns and cities both compete and collaborate to maximise their own
competitive position. The major cities are seen as the main powerhouses of growth, with
other towns and cities trading on particular distinctive skills sets or tourist offers and spill-
3over effects from the major cities. Working together they can act as a more powerful voice to
argue for investment from central government.
Our interviews with local authorities confirmed that cities do consider competing, but they
consider different cities as competitors for different aspects. For example when competing
for investment from creative industries to locate jobs, cities from further afield will be
considered as competitors, but when competing for regional funds from government they will
team with neighbouring cities. However, when it comes to charges for using transport
facilities such as parking then they will consider local neighbours as competitors and will
consider the charges levied in other local towns. Finally, when it comes to road user
charging (which is not common in cities within the UK except London), the cities suggest that
there would be a hierarchy of charges to consider akin to the parking charges and so some
form of strategic charging or competition may well evolve.
Whilst cities seem to compete at inter-city level for example through the use of parking
charges or tolls, research in the transport literature has focused predominantly on intra-city
issues. The strong focus in recent years has been on road user charging, economic theory
suggesting benefits will accrue to a city from a combination of congestion relief and recycling
of revenues within the city (Manville and King 2013, May et al 2010). Beyond the theoretical
benchmark of full marginal cost pricing, the design of practical charging schemes, such as
those adopted by local authorities in recent Transport Innovation Funds (TIF) bids in the UK,
has generally focused on pricing cordons around single, mono-centric cities (Shepherd et al,
2008). It is possible in such cases to design the location and level of charges for a cordon so
as to systematically maximise the potential welfare gain to the city (Shepherd and Sumalee,
2004; Sumalee et al, 2005), yet there is an implicit premise in here that the city acts in
isolation.
Whilst we have found no empirical studies examining competing cities in the transport
sphere, a handful of studies address aspects of competition. In the context of toll roads,
several authors have studied the welfare implications of competition between a public and
private operator (Verhoef et al, 1996; De Palma & Lindsey, 2000; Yang et al, 2009). The
4focus in these studies is on the impacts of alternative ownership regimes, and of public
versus private control in the form of either monopoly pricing or competitive Nash Equilibria
(Nash Equilibrium is reached when a player cannot improve their own welfare when the
other players have decided their own strategies). De Borger et al (2007) and Ubbels &
Verhoef (2008) studied a more closely related problem of competition between
countries/regions setting tolls and capacities, investigating the implications of players
adopting two-stage games or different strategies.
In parallel, several pertinent recent studies have appeared on the evolution of city structures
and tolls under different assumptions. Levinson et al (2006) and Zhang et al (2007) used an
agent-based approach to investigate how networks evolve over time. In this area of study,
while Mun et al (2005) focused on the development of a non-monocentric, linear city, others
have opted to develop two-dimensional continuum models involving finite element solution
methods capable of representing multiple Central Business Districts (CBD) (Ho et al, 2005;
Ho & Wong, 2007). From the field of Economic Geography, the recent contribution by Anas
& Pines (2008) analyses the move away from monocentric to polycentric models. In spite of
their relevance to the proposed study, none of the above approaches considers direct
competition between cities, nor does the inter-play between parking charges and road user
tolls (either within or between cities), for which Marsden (2009) found evidence.
When we move to a polycentric case, competition between cities may arise as described
above. Issues of short-term destination changes and potentially longer term household and
business relocation decisions thus need to be considered.
Mun et al (2005) studied optimal cordon pricing in a one dimensional linear city with more
than one CBD. Their research revealed that cordon pricing is not always effective for
congestion management in polycentric linear cities and it tends to be effective as the urban
structure is more mono-centric. Our work differs significantly from that of Mun et al. in that
we analyse the optimal toll between two cities competing with each other whereas Mun et al.
consider one city with many CBDs.
5The aim of this paper is to model the impacts of demand management strategies on optimal
tolls and longer-term business and residential location choices in competing cities. This is a
continuation of the work reported in Shepherd and Balijepalli (2012a, b) which had outlined
the initial model set up and discussed the preliminary results. The research uses a dynamic
land use transport interaction model of two neighbouring cities to analyse the impacts by
setting up an optimisation game between the two cities which are assumed to maximise the
welfare of their own residents. The work builds on the earlier work by Koh et al (2012) who
studied competition in a small network using a static equilibrium approach for private cars
who have a choice of route (when tolled) but without a land use feedback mechanism. It was
found that when cities compete in terms of welfare, there was the possibility that the
outcome of the game was a classic Nash Trap whereby both cities may end up worse off.
That is to say that allowing competition between the two cities results in residents in both
cities being worse off than under the co-operative or regulated case as well as worse off
than in the no toll case. Our research extends this by setting up a dynamic model which
includes slow modes, private car, public transport bus, rail and investigates the longer term
location responses.
The model is used first to study an isolated city (representative of Leeds) and a standard
welfare function is used to determine the optimal toll around the central area and its impacts
on location decisions and other transport indicators. A twin city is then added to the model
thus introducing traffic between the cities. This traffic may be charged to enter the central
area along with own residents, however the revenue may be retained by the charging city -
a form of tax exporting behaviour which would in theory increase the welfare of the city.
Thus both cities will have an incentive to charge and a game may evolve.
With this simple model set up we study the impact on the optimal tolls set by the cities and
how the game develops between cities, firstly of equal size and amenity (the symmetric
case) and secondly with cities which differ in size and amenity (the asymmetric case). The
impact on location decisions and other transport indicators will be investigated as will the
implications for regulation and the development of cities within regional partnerships.
6This paper is divided into four sections including the present one. Section 2 describes the
development of a dynamic model and in particular introduces the small model approach to
developing a land use transport interaction model for the cases of symmetric and
asymmetric cities. Section 3 introduces the welfare measure used in the modelling and
reports the numerical results on optimal tolls for various modelled scenarios including the
regulated cases and competitive Nash Games. This section then reports the sensitivity of
welfare gains to the level of interaction between the cities. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
work and identifies the directions for further work.
2. DYNAMIC LAND USE TRANSPORT INTERACTION MODEL
Metropolitan Activity Relocation and Simulation (MARS) is a strategic dynamic Integrated
Land Use and Transport model. The basic underlying hypothesis of MARS is that
settlements and activities within them are self-organising systems. MARS is based on the
principles of systems dynamics (Sterman 2000) and synergetics (Haken 1983) and can
model the complex interactions between the land use and transport systems. The present
version of MARS is implemented in Vensim®, a System Dynamics programming, simulation
environment. MARS is capable of analysing policy combinations at the city/regional level and
assessing their impacts over a 30 year planning period. Figure 1 shows an overview of the
MARS model. There are three sub-models within MARS, viz., transport, residential location
and workplace location sub-models. The transport sub-model determines the demand for
travel between zones for a given land use pattern and estimates the number of trips by a
given mode of transport such as car, bus, train, walking and cycling for peak and off-peak
periods. The output of the transport sub-model includes an accessibility measure which
influences the residential and workplace location choices. Rents, land prices and land
availability also influence where land is developed and the location choice of residents.
These sub-models then interact over time and the system responds to exogenous inputs for
growth in residents, jobs and car ownership and to any policy instruments simulated. Thus
the system modelled here is a non-equilibrium one as it keeps evolving continuously over
7time.
Figure 1 Overview of the MARS model
Figures 2 and 3 show examples of the Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD) for the main responses
included within MARS for commute trips by car and for development and relocation of
residences respectively.
Figure 2 shows the CLD for the factors which affect the number of commute trips taken by
car from one zone to another. Starting with the balancing feedback loop B1, commute trips
by car increase as the attractiveness by car increases which in turn increases the search
time for a parking space which then decreases the attractiveness of car use – hence the
balancing nature of the loop. Loop B2 represents the effect of congestion – as trips by car
increase speeds decrease, times increase and so attractiveness is decreased. Loop B3
show the impact on fuel costs, in our urban case as speeds increase fuel consumption is
decreased – again we have a balancing feedback.
8Figure 2 CLD for the transport model – commute trips by car in MARS
Figure 3 CLD for development of housing in MARS
Figure 3 shows the CLD for the development of housing and the interaction with location
choice of residents in MARS. Starting with the development of housing, loop H1 is a
balancing feedback loop which shows that the attractiveness to the developer to develop in a
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9given zone is determined by the rent which can be achieved. The level of the rent is driven
by the excess demand for housing which in turn is related to the housing stock and new
housing developments. As new houses are developed the stock is increased which reduces
the excess demand which then reduces the rent achievable which reduces the
attractiveness to develop – resulting in a balancing loop. Loop H2 is a reinforcing loop as
new housing reduces the excess demand which reduces rent and hence land price which in
turn makes development more attractive all other things being equal. Loop H3 represents
the restriction of land available for development; as land available is reduced then the
attractiveness to develop is reduced. Loop H4 extends H3 to represent the effect of land
availability on land price.
The housing development loops are linked to the residents’ location choice. Firstly the main
elements considered to influence the choice of location are rent, accessibility and area
quality. As area quality is difficult to measure it is normal to take some kind of proxy for
quality, in this case average income. The main loops in the residential choice are M1 which
is a balancing feedback loop – as more people move in excess demand increases which
increases rent which then reduces attractiveness to move in. M2 is also a balancing loop
which shows that as the number of residents increases in a zone then congestion out of that
zone increases which reduces accessibility to workplaces and so reduces attractiveness to
move in.
Loop M3 is a positive feedback loop which simply shows that as the number of residents
increases in a zone then the potential for moving out also increases (set as 10% of residents
per year in the simplest case). This increases the pool of potential movers, which also
includes growth in population (which could come from natural growth or in-migration and is
taken from an exogenous forecast per annum). Loop M4 is a positive feedback loop which
extends H1 – as more people move in this increases excess demand which increases rent
and so increases attractiveness to develop which in turn increases the housing stock. Here
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it should be noted that housing stock available can limit the number of people allowed to
move in to a zone as any excess demand is reallocated to other zones. This process
reflects reality where excess demand must be taken up elsewhere if the capacity for
residential occupation is reached in any one time period. Following the principles described
above, a MARS model was developed for the Leeds Metropolitan Area with 33-zones
representing the electoral wards. The population, employment, land available for
development were based on official data from the Council and national census data. The
transport data was taken from publicly available data and from an aggregation of the Leeds
SATURN model. Growth in population and workplaces were based on DfT’s TEMPRO
forecasts (DfT 2010). The outcomes of the model were calibrated to match the official
forecasts available, for more detail see Pfaffenbichler et al (2010).
The performance of the MARS Leeds model has also been assessed by evaluating outturn
elasticities, viz., fare and fuel elasticities. The out-turn fare elasticities were compared with
standard values as reported in The Demand for Public Transport: a Practical Guide,
(Balcombe et al, 2004). Similarly, the fuel elasticities were compared with the values
published by Goodwin et al (2004). The fuel price elasticity was seen to be -0.1 which
agrees well with the commuter value of Litman (2013) and also with the mean value of
Goodwin et al (2004), while the fare elasticity was seen to be -0.16 which is low but within in
the range for urban areas as per TRL Report 593.
2.1 Developing an aggregate model
Following the discussion in Ghaffarzadegan et al (2011) who highlight the benefits of using
small system dynamics models in addressing public policy issues, we chose to aggregate
the model from 33 zones to only 2 zones to simplify the presentation of the results which
would otherwise become difficult to follow when moving to a twin city model with many
zones. However while recognising the benefits of simplification for presentation of results,
we first of all describe the aggregation process and compare results of the 2-zone model
with the previous 33-zone model. Demographic and land use parameters such as
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population, number of jobs, land available for development have been summed for zones 1-
13 of the large model to form zone 1 (inner zone) of the small model; the remaining zones in
the large model viz., 14-33 are then summed to form the outer zone 2 of the small model.
During the aggregation process we compared the results with the model outcomes of the 33-
zone model to ensure that the small model responds in a similar manner to that of the large
model in two different scenarios viz., do-nothing and then with a 5€ cordon charge. Table 1
compares the population in the base year 2001 and forecast year 2030 between the 33-zone
model and the 2-zone model. The aggregate model of Leeds was calibrated to reproduce a
similar distribution of residents across the zones in year 2030. Table 2 shows that the total
growth in jobs in the 2-zone model is consistent with that in the 33-zone model, however,
their distribution between the zones is less so. Akin to the large model the aggregate model
also predicts a higher growth in zone 2 than in zone 1 though to a lesser extent. Whilst this is
not as consistent as the residential response, it is the relative change between tolled and un-
tolled scenarios which informs our analysis.
Table 1: Distribution of population in Leeds
33-zone model 2-zone model
Area Year
2001
Year
2030
Growth
(%)
Year
2001
Year
2030
Growth
(%)
Zone1 (1-13) 262560 343384 30.8% 262560 342879 30.6%
Zone2 (14-33) 453042 621801 37.3% 453042 621780 37.3%
Total 715602 965185 34.9% 715602 964659 34.8%
Table 2: Distribution of jobs in Leeds
33-zone model 2-zone model
Area Year
2001
Year
2030
Growth
(%)
Year
2001
Year
2030
Growth
(%)
Zone1 (1-13) 218700 246634 12.8% 218700 262746 20.1%
Zone2 (14-33) 133400 188303 41.2% 133400 171615 28.7%
Total 352100 434936 23.5% 352100 434361 23.4%
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Table 3 compares the modal share in year 2001 and year 2030 between the 33-zone model
and the 2-zone model. It is noted that the 2-zone model reproduces the modal shares of the
large model well with the exception of rail which is slightly under-predicted in the aggregate
model.
Table 3: Modal share of commuting tours
33-zone model 2-zone model
Mode Year 2001 Year 2030 Year 2001 Year 2030
Car 49.7% 51.1% 50.1% 51.1%
Rail 2.9% 2.7% 1.3% 1.2%
Bus 28.0% 27.1% 28.5% 28.3%
Slow 19.5% 19.2% 20.1% 19.4%
In order to verify further whether the 2-zone model would respond to policy inputs in a similar
manner to that of the 33-zone model, a 5€ cordon charge to enter the inner zone in both the
models (zone 1 in the small model and zones 1-13 in the large model) was implemented. It
was noted that the relative change in population and jobs with a 5€ charge over the do
nothing scenario are small (results for the twin city cases will be discussed in detail later).
These results are similar to those noted by others e.g. Jenson (1999), Anas & Xu (1999) and
Anas and Hiramatsu (2013). Table 4 shows the main impact which is the change in modal
share of commuting tours with a 5€ charge. In particular, it shows that car mode loses about
3% of its share and most of it would be absorbed by the bus. As a result of the shift in modal
use, the travel times in MARS would improve for all road users which are accounted for in
the welfare function as described later. It is noted that under the charging regime both
models show a very similar reduction in car share in the peak, the small model shows a
slightly higher increase in share for bus but this is still a good representation of the more
detailed model and suitable for the purpose of this study.
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Table 4: Change in modal share (peak) in year 2030 with 5€ charge
33-zone model 2-zone model
Mode Do-nothing 5€ charge Do-nothing 5€ charge
Car 51.1% 48.5% 51.1% 48.1%
Rail 2.7% 2.8% 1.2% 1.2%
Bus 27.1% 28.9% 28.3% 30.9%
Slow 19.2% 19.8% 19.4% 19.8%
2.2 Symmetric case
In order to investigate the impacts of competition between cities on optimal tolls and other
indicators, our first step was to develop a simple hypothetical case study involving two
identical cities. Thus we took the 2-zone model of Leeds as described in the previous section
and copied it to form a twin city model with 4 zones based on the idea of two identical cities
within reach of one another (see Figure 4). In the single city model the population of Leeds is
split between the inner zone 1 and the outer zone 2 with more growth predicted in the outer
zones by 2030. We call this City A and the additional hypothetical neighbouring city we will
call City B. The model naturally deals with interaction between cities in terms of commute
choices and also allows for relocation between the cities. In what follows, each city may
decide to charge car users to travel to the central area (zones 1 or 3) within the peak period.
A charge will be applied to their own residents as well as those from the other city.
Figure 4: The twin-city zones
2.3 Asymmetric case
After developing the symmetric case and in order to make the case more realistic, we then
extended the model of symmetric cities to asymmetric cities by revising the characteristics of
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City B. City A continues to be based on the population of Leeds which is split between the
inner zone 1 and the outer zone 2 as described earlier, but the neighbouring City B is now
reduced in size and is based loosely on Bradford which is located 18km (11.2 miles) away
from Leeds. Thus we now have the case of two neighbouring cities with differing populations
and workplaces and thus with different workplace-population ratios based on a realistic
setting.
Table 5 shows the distribution of base year population, work places and
workplace/population ratio in the zones in City A and City B in the census year 2001. Note
that the population and work places have been calibrated to match the estimates for Leeds
and Bradford as given by TEMPRO. Notice that the workplace population ratios for zones 1
and 2 (City A) are slightly higher than the corresponding values in zones 3 and 4 (City B) so
we should expect a higher proportion of trips to travel from City B to City A than in the
reverse from A to B.
Table 5 Distribution of base year population and workplaces in the two cities
Region Base year
population
Base year
work places
Workplace/
population ratio
City A: Zone 1 262,560 218,700 0.833
City A: Zone 2 453,042 133,400 0.294
City B: Zone 3 168,038 134,369 0.800
City B: Zone 4 289,947 81,961 0.283
The asymmetric case has been calibrated to the level of interaction between the two cities
represented by the observed number of trips between Leeds and Bradford (See Table 6).
This is achieved by introducing city specific factors which weigh up the attraction between
inter-city origin-destination pairs. This can be thought of as a proxy for some unobserved
preference to work in a city over the other such as a skills mis-match or other household
decisions which impact on travel choice such as child care. In other words there are barriers
to travel across city boundaries other than those which can be explained by the transport
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costs. The resulting trips after the calibration exercise are shown in Table 6. The proportions
of trips from Leeds to Bradford and from Bradford to Leeds are comparable to the
proportions given in a study by Simmonds and Skinner (2006). As expected the proportion
from Bradford to Leeds is much higher due to the higher jobs to population ratio in Leeds
which will give the larger city greater tax exporting opportunities.
Table 6 Modelled commuting tours between City A and City B
Number of
commuting tours
(2001) per day#
Modelled
commuting tours
per day in MARS
Proportion of
trips to other
city
Leeds to Bradford 15260 15266 4.7%
Bradford to Leeds 21261 21267 10.9%
Source: # City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, Big Plan II, Transport Intelligence Briefing,
2010
3. NUMERICAL STUDIES
This section describes the application of the MARS model under various charging regimes
for the symmetric and asymmetric cases as described above. Before explaining the
scenarios considered, we first explain the welfare measure used.
3.1 Welfare measures
For each city, the local authority is assumed to maximise the welfare of their citizens. The
traditional form of welfare measure within the transport field is the Marshallian measure
which sums the consumer and producer surpluses. For tolling, the welfare measure
includes the assumption that all revenues collected are recycled within the system i.e.
shared back between the residents of the charging city, typically by investing in
improving/maintaining the roads/public transport. In our case study, we assume that the
revenue collected from non-residents is retained by the charging city and is recycled within
the charging city i.e. tax exporting behaviour is assumed. The welfare measure may be
estimated by the so called “rule of a half” (Williams, (1977)) and is based on official UK
Department for Transport advice (DfT, 2011). We simplify the welfare measure within our
study by considering the impact on private traffic in the peak hours only. Whilst this is a
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simplification of the full appraisal, it does account for the main impacts of a peak charging
scheme, i.e. private traffic time savings due to a change of mode and the monetary impacts
of a peak charge where revenue is assumed to be ear-marked for the city.
For the isolated city, the local authority objective to maximise welfare coincides with the
objective of a higher level regulator e.g. the national government or some appointed
regulator. But in the two city case, we now have two authorities whose aim is to optimise the
welfare of their residents – including their journeys to/from the other city region. The welfare
measure for each city is similar in principle to that of an isolated city, but now we need to
consider transfers of revenue from City A to City B and vice versa, and the particular welfare
measures for each of City A and City B are written as below:
ܹ஺ = ∑ ∑ ቄ− ଵଶ ∝ൣ ൫ݐ௜௝ଵ − ݐ௜௝଴൯൫ܶ ௜௝ଵ + ௜ܶ௝଴൯൧− ଵଶ[ ஺߬ ( ଶܶଵଵ + ଶܶଵ଴ )]− ଵଶ [ ஻߬ ( ௜ܶଷଵ + ௜ܶଷ଴)]ቅ+ସ௝ୀଵଶ௜ୀଵ
ܶଶଵ
ଵ
஺߬ + ∑ ௜ܶଵଵ ஺߬ସ௜ୀଷ − ∑ ௜ܶଷଵ ஻߬ଶ௜ୀଵ (1)
ܹ ஻ = ∑ ∑ ቄ− ଵଶ ∝ൣ ൫ݐ௜௝ଵ − ݐ௜௝଴൯൫ܶ ௜௝ଵ + ௜ܶ௝଴൯൧− ଵଶ [ ஻߬ ( ସܶଷଵ + ସܶଷ଴ )]− ଵଶ[ ஺߬ ( ௜ܶଵଵ + ௜ܶଵ଴)]ቅ+ସ௝ୀଵସ௜ୀଷ
ܶସଷ
ଵ
஻߬ + ∑ ௜ܶଷଵ ஻߬ଶ௜ୀଵ − ∑ ௜ܶଵଵ ஺߬ସ௜ୀଷ (2)
where,
ݐ௜௝
ଵ = travel time between each Origin destination (OD) pair ij with road charge (superscript 1)
ݐ௜௝
଴ = travel time between each OD pair ij without road charge (superscript 0)
௜ܶ௝
ଵ = trips between each OD pair with road charge
௜ܶ௝
଴ = trips between each OD pair without road charge
஺߬, ஻߬= toll charge to enter the central zone in City A or City B
α =  Value of travel Time1 (VoT)
Equation (1) sums the rule of half time benefits and the rule of half money benefits
(consumer surplus) with the net revenue to residents of City A (producer surplus). The time
1 Based on UK Department for Transport guidance – webtag unit 3.5.6 see www.dft.gov.uk/webtag
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and money benefits include the savings accrued to all trips originating from City A, i.e. i =
1,2, destined to any of the zones in City A or City B i.e. j = 1,2,3,4. This means time savings
to residents of City A are accounted for in both the cities i.e. whether they occur on the
network in City A or City B. The net revenue collected by City A is equal to the sum of the toll
revenue collected in A from City A’s residents and that from City B’s residents together with
the transfer of money from City A to City B to account for the toll paid in City B by the
residents of City A. These revenue terms which transfer funds between the two cities are
important and form the basis of the tax exporting mechanism. An identical logic has been
used to derive the welfare sum for City B as shown in equation (2).
The welfare measure adopted in this research is a simplified version of the full scale of
welfare. It is further simplified by considering the impact on private traffic in the peak hours
only. However, we affirm that this is not too simplistic as it does account for the main
impacts of a peak charging scheme, i.e. private car traffic time savings and the monetary
impacts of a peak charge whose revenue is assumed to be ear-marked for the city.
Moreover the time savings to private traffic take into account the secondary effect of modal
shift towards public transport as well as the re-distribution of trips. However, a full scale
welfare function would include the benefits accrued to public transport passengers and those
using slow modes. As we are interested in peak road user charging only in our study the
monetary and time benefits accruing to the private car users would tend to dominate the full
welfare function and so the welfare functions described in (1) and (2) are taken to be
sufficiently robust to offer interesting insights into the dynamics of competition between the
cities when considering only road tolls of this nature. Equally, we ignore any impacts due to
changes in land use as is acceptable when changes are relatively small, see for example the
advice in the PROSPECTS methodological guidebook (Minken et al, 2003).
For a global regulator the welfare is simply equal to the sum of the welfare of City A and City
B which is written as:
ܹ = ܹ஺ + ܹ ஻ (3)
Note that in equation (3) when the welfares of City A and City B are summed together the
non-resident toll revenue transfers between City A and City B cancel out with each other i.e.
there is no benefit or consideration of tax exporting behaviour in the regulated case. In all
cases below, the benefit streams generated over the 30 year study period will be discounted
to form a Net Present Value of benefits discounted at 3.5% (DfT 2012).
Before presenting the results of various scenarios, it is useful to demonstrate how the
welfare measures evolve over time and how the individual and collective benefits may vary
when a toll is imposed. Figure 5 shows, in the symmetric cities case, how the welfare varies
over time for City A, City B and in total as City A charges a toll of 5€ from year 5 onwards.
Figure 5 Variation in welfare over time when C
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willing to pay the charge compared to the do-nothing case. The benefits are made up from a
combination of time and money benefits and also include the revenues collected from both
residents (City A) and non-residents (City B). City B’s residents whilst benefitting from some
time savings, lose all the toll revenues paid to City A and so the welfare change in City B is
negative. The total welfare for City A and City B put together becomes positive after year 20
when the time savings outweigh the money losses in the system. Note that in the first year
of implementation the benefits oscillate for a few months as the feedback loops in the model
take time to respond to the charges imposed. Whilst City A gains significantly from a charge
of 5€, City B clearly loses out and given the symmetry in this case we would expect them to
react with a charge of their own (there is obviously an incentive to begin charging for both
cities from the above figure).
Figure 6(a) shows how the NPV of welfare for City A (and, due to symmetry, City B) varies
with combinations of tolls from City A and City B in the range 0-8€ while Figure 6(b) shows
the NPV of total welfare surface. The surfaces are smooth and convex in nature which
indicates that we do not expect multiple local Nash Equilibria as was found in Koh et al
(2012). Looking at the City A surface, it can be seen that when City B does not charge, we
should expect a maximum change in welfare for City A to occur for a toll of around 5 €.
However as City B would have the same welfare surface with tolls transposed (due to
symmetry) they would also be incentivised to toll. The Nash Equilibrium in this case will be
at a point where the derivative of own city welfare with respect to own toll is zero for both
cities. Due to the symmetry in this case, we can plot the point of intersection between the
line where the gradient = 0 and the equal toll line and so the Nash Equilibrium should be
found for a toll of around 6€ as shown by point N.
20
Figure 6(a) NPV of welfare in City A
Figure 6(b) NPV of total welfare
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Figure 6(b) shows the total welfare surface as tolls are varied. By inspection we may expect
that a regulated solution (i.e. when a higher authority e.g. National Government or City-
Region Combined Authority aims to maximise the total welfare as specified by equation (3)
earlier) would be for both cities to set tolls of around 2.5€. In this case the tax exporting
behaviour or incentive is removed by regulation and all toll revenues are recycled within the
whole system.
3.2 Modelled scenarios
This section sets out the optimal tolls and welfare implications for a number of different
scenarios, namely :-
 Isolated city – City A tolls (2-zone model)
 City A or B tolls alone within the two city set up (4-zone model)
 City A or B regulated (4-zone model)
 City A and City B – regulated (4-zone model)
 City A and City B Nash Game (4-zone model)
In the first scenario, City A is considered in isolation and the local authority solution is to
maximise the welfare of all residents. In this case there is no tax exporting behaviour as
there is only one city to investigate. The next two scenarios consider City A or City B tolling
within the two-city set up so some tax exporting behaviour is now possible. The addition of
the ‘City A or B regulated’ test allows us to compare the solutions when a higher level
regulator controls the toll in one of the cities to maximise the welfare of residents from both
cities. The final two scenarios consider tolling in both cities of which the first one is a
regulated scenario2 where tolls are set to maximise the total welfare of all residents, and the
second is a Nash Game where cities compete against each other aiming to maximise their
own residents’ welfare in a non-co-operative manner. In this final scenario, tax exporting
behaviour is assumed and revenues are not recycled between the cities. Note that all four of
2 Regulation is a form of cooperation but when two cities play a cooperative game whether they reach
the global optimal solution is a completely different point. We have dealt with that question in a
separate paper. See Shepherd and Balijepalli (2015) for further details.
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the two-city scenarios from the above consider both symmetric and asymmetric cases
except the City A or B scenario for the symmetric case where presenting the results for one
city would sufficient due to the symmetry.
Next, it should be noted that as the model predicts the impacts over a 30 year period we
could in theory allow the tolls to vary over time. We would expect as the population is set to
increase, the congestion would increase so we may expect the tolls to increase over time as
potential time benefits increase. However to simplify the discussion and presentation of
results we instead only consider constant or flat tolls over time fixed in absolute terms.
In order to find the optimal toll levels, the VENSIM optimisation tool was used to maximise
the appropriate welfare measure by varying the values of the relevant tolls. Note that to
calculate the Nash Equilibrium solution, a diagonalisation approach was used whereby City
A maximises their own welfare first with tolls for City B held constant, then City B optimises
their welfare with tolls for City A held at the previous iteration value. This was repeated until
convergence which was usually found to be within three to four rounds of each optimisation
game.
3.3 Optimal tolls: symmetric cities
Table 7 shows the optimal tolls and Net Present Value (NPV) of welfare change for each city
plus the total welfare change for both cities for the symmetric cases.
Table 7: Optimal tolls and NPV of welfare in year 30 for the symmetric cases
Scenario
Optimal
Tolls €
Welfare A
Million €
Welfare B
Million €
Total Welfare
Million €
City A 2-zone only 2.63 71.7 N/A 71.7
Single City A 5.00 419.1 -502.0 -82.9
Regulated Single
City 1.86 287.1 -155.1 132.0
Regulated 2-city 2.53 179.3 179.3 358.6
Nash Game 6.08 -27.9 -27.9 -55.8
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First of all the optimal tolls found by the VENSIM optimisation facility for the single city (in the
twin-city setting), the Nash Game and the regulated 2-city scenario are in line with the grid
search results shown in Figures 6(a)-(b). Next, if a city is assumed to be an isolated city
then the optimal tolls are lower than when the same city has a neighbour and is able to
extract toll revenue from a neighbouring city. The welfare for City A is also significantly
higher when A tolls alone and toll exporting behaviour is allowed. This increase in the welfare
of City A is at the expense of those living in City B, but the total welfare change over both
cities shows that together they are worse off as the total welfare change is negative.
Regulation of a single City A, in the twin city setting, results in lower tolls for the regulated
city, with lower welfare for City A, and a corresponding lower reduction in welfare for City B
and the two cities together are better off in terms of the overall welfare. This is due to the fact
that the regulation considers residents of two cities together and thus mitigates the issues
associated with tax exporting behaviour. However residents from City B are still worse off
compared to the no toll situation and the regulator should consider some re-distribution of
the revenues from City A to City B to compensate for the negative welfare in City B.
Due to symmetry, the tolls under the twin city regulated case are equal and are between the
single city toll levels and those resulting from the Nash Game, they are also higher than the
single city regulated case. The regulated two city case returns the highest total welfare as
would be expected, but the welfare to each city is much lower than could be achieved in
regulated and un-regulated single city case. The most interesting case is the Nash Game
where both cities engage in a competitive game against each other and results in the highest
tolls. As a result, both cities are worse off than in the no toll case with a reduction in welfare.
This is the classic Nash Trap outcome which appeared in the work of Koh et al (2012) as
described earlier. Note that whilst we have found a classic lose-lose outcome similar to that
in the earlier work, we have shown that in the present case there are no Local Nash
Equilibria (LNE) as observed in Koh et al (2012). The LNE reported in Koh et al arose due
to network specific route choices where the path-set varied with the toll. The fact that we
have only one Nash Equilibrium simplifies the discussion around policy implications as there
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are no local solutions which lie close to the regulated solution as was the case in the earlier
work.
3.4 Optimal tolls: asymmetric cities
Table 8 shows the optimal tolls and NPV of welfare for the asymmetric cities. In this case the
level of interaction has been calibrated as described earlier to be representative of the
interaction between Leeds and Bradford. The results show that the optimal charge for City A
alone is higher than for City B alone and the welfare gain is also higher. This is due to the
larger size of City A together with a proportion of non-residents entering the cordon and
paying the fee in City A (recall City A has a higher workplace/population ratio and so draws in
a higher proportion of commuters from City B, than City B does from City A). Comparing
these results shows that City A has more of an incentive to begin charging than does City B.
When a regulator controls City A alone then the tolls are lower than for the un-regulated City
A scenario with greater total welfare gain together with lower gains for City A, and a lower
reduction in welfare for City B as in the symmetric case. Similar changes are seen for the
regulation of City B. From the whole system point of view there is more to be gained from
tolling in City A than in City B due to the greater population and associated time savings.
Regulation of both cities results in higher charges in both cities compared to single regulated
cases, though the tolls are still lower than the cities would charge in the single city cases.
The total welfare is the highest for the 2-city regulated case, though the individual city
welfare gains are lower than all previous single city cases. This would suggest that a city
may prefer the single city regulated case over the 2-city regulated case, though a regulator
would prefer both cities to be under its control. The Nash Game again results in the highest
charges for both cities, as cities react to the tolls set by the other city. The welfare changes
are however both positive in the asymmetric case, though still lower than the regulated case
and with higher optimal tolls applied to both cities. So while this is a Nash Trap, it does not
result in a negative outcome for either city as was the case in the symmetric scenario. This
is thought to be due to the lower level of interaction between the cities than that observed in
25
the Leeds-Bradford case presented here and therefore lower opportunity for tax exporting
behaviour. The sensitivity of results to the level of interaction will thus be interesting which is
discussed further in Section 3.6 later.
Table 8: Optimal tolls and NPV of welfare in year 30 for the asymmetric cases
Scenario Tolls €
Welfare A
Million €
Welfare B
Million €
Total welfare
Million €
Single City A 2.47 128.08 -57.58 70.50
Single City B 2.17 -50.75 61.76 11.01
Regulated City A 1.76 119.72 -39.96 79.76
Regulated City B 1.16 -26.63 50.54 23.92
Regulated 2-city: A:1.93 97.68 19.67 117.34
B:1.48
Nash Game: A:2.63 87.48 12.64 100.12
B:2.41
3.5 Long term land use response to tolls
The land use response is measured in terms of change in residents and change in the
number of workplaces over the do-nothing case at the end of the study period i.e. year 30. A
negative value indicates residents/jobs moving out of the zone and a positive number
indicates residents/jobs moving into the zone.
Table 9 shows the change in residents for the symmetric case. First of all we can see that
with a 2-zone model, residents are attracted to the charged zone. This is because of the
reduction in accessibility for residents in zone 2 due to the change which increases the
relative attractiveness of residing within zone 1. Note that there is also a small increase in
accessibility for those already living in zone 1 as there is less congestion within the charged
area. Note that the change in residents is less than 1% of the total residents residing in
zone 2 in the do-nothing case and that small changes noted due to road pricing are
consistent with other studies (e.g. Jenson (1999), Anas & Xu (1999) and Anas & Hiramatsu
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(2013) for large cordons). Moving onto the four zone model scenarios, with the single City A
charging alone Table 9 indicates that residents are attracted from zones 2, 4 towards the
charged zone 1. Residential location choice is based on housing costs, relative
accessibilities and income to represent the attractiveness of an area. Whilst the absolute
accessibility of zones 2, 3 and 4 is reduced by the toll around zone 1, the relative
attractiveness of zones 1, 3 improves so residents relocate from zones 2 and 4 towards the
central zones with more going towards the charged zone 1. The net effect on City B is a
loss of over 3000 residents to City A (still only a small percentage of the total residents in
City B). When a regulator controls a single city or both cities, the impacts are dampened
due to the lower tolls. Finally, when the cities compete against each other we have the
highest tolls and greatest movements from outer to inner zones (still only around 1.25%).
However as this is a symmetrical case, when both cities charge the same toll there is no net
movement of residents between cities.
Table 10 shows the change in residents for the asymmetric cases in response to optimal
tolls described earlier. The location choice again depends on changes in relative
accessibility and we can see that when City A charges alone, residents move into the
charged area and City B loses over 900 residents to City A after allowing for the gain in zone
3. When City B charges alone in the asymmetric case, whilst zone 3 attracts over 2000
residents, an even larger number of residents (over 3100) move from zone 4 City B to City A
and zone 3 of City B. This is because of the larger number of job opportunities in City A and
so despite absolute reductions in accessibility from zones 1 and 2 due to the charge to travel
to zone 3, the relative accessibilities of zones 1 and 2 improve compared to zone 4 which
has the largest absolute reduction in accessibility. Regulated single city cases show similar
patterns to the unregulated cases but responses are smaller due to lower charges. The
regulated two-city case and the Nash Game scenario display similar trends in that residents
are attracted to the inner zones. However, City B loses residents to City A in both cases and
more so in the Nash Game where the tolls are higher. These results suggest that City B
loses residents in all scenarios and could be seen as the weaker city. However the losses
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are only in the order of 1-2% in the worst case. Whilst this movement was only in the order
of one percent of all residents, it still could be a cause for concern where cities are perceived
to be in decline.
Table 9 Change in residents in year 30: symmetric cases
Scenario Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4
City A 2-zone
only
2230
(0.66%)
-2230
(-0.35%) NA NA
Single City A 7277
(2.16%)
-4165
(-0.66%)
219
(0.07%)
-3331
(-0.53%)
Regulator City A 3491
(1.04%)
-2076
(-0.33%)
229
(0.07%)
-1644
(-0.26%)
Regulator 2-city 4622
(1.37%)
-4622
(-0.73%)
4622
(1.37%)
-4622
(-0.73%)
Nash Game 7851
(2.34%)
-7851
(-1.25%)
7851
(2.34%)
-7851
(-1.25%)
Table 10 Change in residents in year 30: asymmetric cases
Scenario Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4
Single City A 2672
(0.76%)
-1765
(-0.27%)
515
(0.26%)
-1427
(-0.37%)
Single City B 2557
(0.73%)
649
(0.10%)
2137
(1.07%)
-5343
(-1.37%)
Regulator City A 2210
(0.63%)
-1407
(-0.22%)
362
(0.18%)
-1165
(-0.30%)
Regulator City B 1523
(0.44%)
427
(0.07%)
1240
(0.62%)
-3190
(-0.82%)
Regulator 2-city 3673
(1.05%)
-786
(-0.12%)
2075
(1.04%)
-4962
(-1.27%)
Nash Game 4360
(1.25%)
-595
(-0.09%)
3113
(1.56%)
-6878
(-1.77%)
In terms of changes in workplace locations, jobs were seen to move out from the charged
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areas and the results were found consistent with the modelling work carried out by Jenson
(1999) based on a road user toll ring in Oslo, Norway. They reported a slight employment
decentralisation and residential centralisation in Oslo. In our case study, the relative change
in employment was even smaller than for residents and is not discussed here.
3.6 Sensitivity of optimal tolls and welfare to level of interaction between cities
As mentioned earlier, the level of interaction between cities in the symmetric case was
higher than that seen in reality between the cities of Leeds and Bradford. It was noticeable
that the Nash Game tolls were only slightly higher than the regulated tolls in this case and
that the resulting welfare was positive for both cities rather than negative as in the symmetric
case. In order to understand the relationship between the level of interaction and optimal
tolls a set of sensitivity tests were conducted for both the symmetric and asymmetric cases.
The tests involved factoring the level of interaction up/down between the cities by a common
value in both directions. This is achieved by multiplying the ‘attraction’ in the distribution part
of the model for trips between the cities. We then calculated the new optimal tolls and the
associated welfare changes for the two city regulated and Nash Game scenarios. The level
of interaction was varied from no interaction (factor = 0) through the current value with a
factor of 1, to a doubling of the level of interaction (factor = 2). Figure 7 shows how the
optimal tolls vary with the factor on level of interaction for the symmetric cases. The Nash
Game tolls are higher than the regulator tolls and the gap between regulated and Nash
Game tolls widens as the level of interaction increases. The optimal tolls converge when
there is no interaction between the cities i.e. when there are no trips between them. In this
case, the two cities are acting independently from each other, competition does not have an
adverse effect on the system and there is no need for regulation.
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Figure 7 Optimal Nash Game/Regulator tolls: symmetric cases
Figure 8 shows the NPV of total welfare for the Nash Game and Regulator cases as the
level of interaction is varied. (Note that for this symmetric case we do not need to present
city level welfare changes as they are equal and half the total welfare). As may be expected,
the Nash Game welfare is always lower than the regulator welfare and that the gap in
welfare increases with an increase in the level of interaction. This means as the level of
interaction increases the ability of each city to extract revenue from non-residents also
increases. This results in higher tolls being charged, which are sub-optimal from the
congestion or total welfare point of view. As explained earlier the best response surface for
each authority results in a potential Nash Trap and where interactions are higher the total
welfare turns out to be negative. On the other hand, as the level of interaction decreases, the
welfare outcome for the Nash Game scenario is positive which is consistent with the earlier
comments. Thus when cities strongly interact with each other regulation should be
considered to avoid the negative impacts of competition.
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Figure 8 Optimal total welfare: symmetric cases
Figure 9 shows the Nash Game and Regulator tolls for the asymmetric case. For a factor of
1.0, the figure shows the optimal tolls for the calibrated case of Leeds-Bradford. In general,
the asymmetric cases follow the same trend as that of the symmetric cases, with an
increasing gap between the Nash Game tolls and the regulated tolls as the level of
interaction is increased. As explained previously the initial level of interaction between the
cities is low which reduces the role of tax exporting behaviour. Due to this the welfare for the
asymmetric case is closer to the regulated case and so the optimal tolls under Nash Game
are also low. As the interaction increases the toll by City B exceeds that of City A under the
Nash Game. This is due to the greater proportion of trips coming from City A relative to the
trips within City B which results in a greater impact from the tax exporting element of the
optimal toll in City B compared to City A. Clearly the optimal toll is dependent on the relative
size of the city and number of non-resident drivers making a trip to the charged area. The
increase of toll in City B relative to City A also dampens the net migration from City B to City
A though the effects as discussed previously are relatively small.
When there is no interaction in terms of trips between the cities, the tolls tend to converge
exactly as in the symmetric case. The slight deviation in Nash and Regulator tolls in City B
can be explained by the location response of the residents. While there is no interaction in
terms of trips between the cities, the residents are still able to relocate between the cities
-1200.0
-1000.0
-800.0
-600.0
-400.0
-200.0
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
W
el
fa
re
,m
ill
io
n
€
Level interaction
NPV of Total Welfare - Symmetric Case
Nash
Regulator
31
and as explained in the above it is the relative accessibilities which affect the location
decision. Thus there are some relatively small differences in the location of residents which
arise between the Nash Game and the Regulated Scenario which in turn affects the optimal
tolls. The cities are competing albeit indirectly for residents to increase their own welfare.
This did not arise in the symmetric case as the location responses are symmetric and cancel
each other out as shown earlier where both cities respond with the same tolls.
Figure 9 Optimal Nash Game/Regulator tolls: asymmetric case
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(a) Optimal total welfare
(b) Optimal Welfare by City
Figure 10 Optimal welfare: asymmetric case
Figure 10a shows the total welfare for the Nash Game and regulated scenarios with varying
level of interaction. Figure 10b shows the welfare changes for City A and City B individually.
As the level of interaction is increased the welfare gap between the Nash Game and
regulated scenarios increases and as expected the Nash Game total welfare is always less
than or equal to the regulated case. The variation in welfare for each player does not follow
the same trend however. As the level of interaction increases, the Nash Game welfare
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decreases for both cities though not as much as in the symmetric case. Thus as the level of
interaction increases there is a greater incentive for cities to accept regulation as the
potential gain in welfare is higher for both cities.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the general problem of how cities may compete when cordon tolls are
applied using a strategic land use transport interaction model. This allowed us to consider all
modes of transport together with the longer term re-location response to any tolls imposed.
Firstly the response surface and grid search approach shows that there exists only one Nash
Equilibrium with our model for the cases considered. As the MARS model does not include
route choice, this would suggest that the multiple local Nash Equilibria found by Koh et al are
a result of changes in the path set. Whether or not multiple equilibria exist in more realistic
networks still requires further research, but at least for our model, we found that only one
equilibrium was possible which meant that we could rely on the VENSIM optimisation results
and use the diagonalisation approach to solve the Nash Game scenario.
We then investigated various tolling regimes for a single city and two cities under regulation
and competition. Firstly, we found that if a city planner adds a neighbouring city into the
planning process, then this allows tax exporting behaviour where the city may toll users from
the other city and retain revenues for its own residents. This results in higher tolls and
increased welfare at the expense of the other city.
Regulation of tolls reduces the tolls imposed while increasing the total welfare, though
individual city welfare is lower than can be achieved if tolling alone. This incentive to tolling
alone means that the Nash Game scenario resulted in the highest tolls and the cities fell into
a Nash Trap where both become worse off compared to the no toll case for the symmetric
interaction between the cities.
The asymmetric case study is based on the population and workplace distribution of Leeds
and Bradford and the level of interaction between the two cities was calibrated to observed
data. In general the differences in tolls between the regimes followed the same pattern as
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the symmetric case. However, while the tolls are still the highest in the Nash Game scenario,
the outcome is positive in terms of welfare change for both cities. This raised the question
about the sensitivity of tolls and welfare to the level of interaction under competition.
The sensitivity tests show that as the level of interaction is increases, the potential for tax
exporting behaviour also increases and so the tolls under competition increase. The gap
between welfare outcomes for the cities under competition and for the cities under regulation
also increases with an increase in the level of interaction. As the level of interaction tends to
zero, the tolls under competition converge to the regulated tolls. This suggests, intuitively,
that regulation should be considered where there is significant movement between cities and
that the cities should be encouraged to collaborate for the greater good. Where there are no
significant flows between cities then competition has little adverse impact and cities will not
be competing for revenue from their neighbours but for something on a different level such
as investment from government or the private sector in terms of jobs. In all the sensitivity
tests, both cities would be incentivised to accept regulation though the larger city always
takes a larger share of the welfare changes.
Finally, the long term response to tolls is that the residents move into the charged areas and
the jobs move out of the charged cordons. While the case of symmetric cities showed
identical pattern when both cities charge, the case of asymmetric cities is more interesting in
that the smaller city loses some residents but gains a small number of jobs from the larger
city.
The question of which is the strongest city in terms of cordon charges depends upon how we
view the problem – if we define strength based on toll level, then the larger City A appears to
be strongest, but the smaller City B seems to be implicitly stronger as it can charge a higher
proportion of non-residents and so has a greater tax exporting ‘strength’. However if as one
would expect cities are more concerned about losing residents and jobs to other cities, then
the larger city is the stronger one in this case. Whilst these relative changes were small,
they could be of concern to cities which are thought to be in decline and the regulator would
be under pressure to provide equal benefits per capita via some kind of re-distribution of
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revenues between cities. This would reduce the incentive for the larger city to accept
regulation.
The policy implications are threefold – (i) while there is an incentive to cooperate at local
authority level, this is not achieved due to competition; (ii) where cities compete they may fall
into a Nash Trap where both cities will be worse off compared to the regulated solution; and
(iii) regulation is recommended when there is a strong interaction between the cities but that
the benefits of regulation decrease as interaction between cities decreases and the impact of
competition is lessened.
Future research should consider extending the model to include more than two cities and to
include other objectives such as a reduction in CO2 which would be greater here under the
competitive regime than under the regulated case due to the higher charges imposed.
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